Voting Village In Vegas: Gambling Or Voting? 

As you walk through the lobby of Caesar’s Palace, you marvel at the grand marble pillars and the sea of glittering chandeliers. You are floored by the opulence and glitz that surrounds you. The lobby bustles with tourists looking to win big, and their excitement fills the air. As you open the door to the conference room, though, the atmosphere does a complete 180. Computers, voting machines and E-polling devices fill the room wall to wall, with network and power cables snaked between them. Blinking lights pulse to a steady rhythm. You’ve just stepped into the DEF CON Voting Village. 

White hat hackers (the good guys) travel here annually from around the world to hack into voting machines and report whatever vulnerabilities they find to vendors and authorities. This year, their convergence at Caesar’s Palace took place from the tenth of August to the twelfth. They’ve been meeting since 1993, figuring out how to hack anything from security systems to light bulbs to cars. They started hacking voting machines in 2017.    

That first year, it took them two minutes to hack the system remotely and manipulate the votes. This year, one participant modified the touch-screen voting platform to show a video of Rick Astley’s “Never Gonna Give You Up”—just a fun little prank to demonstrate the system’s vulnerability. But beyond that, they found many real issues. For instance, they were able to use a USB drive to scramble the machines’ tallying capabilities. Though many more issues were found, they’ve been kept closely guarded so as not to fall into the hands of bad actors. 

The hacking team provided their results to the vendors. Unfortunately, none of the vulnerabilities they discovered will be fixed in time for the election. The vendors claim that there isn’t enough time, and that the process is much more complex than the tailoring and debugging of your monthly Microsoft updates. Many of the vulnerabilities DEF CON identified in their first Voting Villages were found again this year. Harri Hursti, Voting Village’s co-founder, said in an interview at the end of the event, “There’s so much basic stuff that should be happening and is not happening, so yes I’m worried about things not being fixed, but they haven’t been fixed for a long time, and I’m also angry about it.” 

Hursti seems concerned about the threat foreign adversaries pose to US elections. He noted that it took his team only two-and-a-half days to find and take advantage of the faults in the system. “If you don’t think this kind of place is running 24/7 in China, Russia, you’re kidding yourselves,” he said. I agree. Any organization with the resources and an incentive can easily hack this infrastructure.   

Jake Braun, another co-founder of the event, noted in a podcast in August that the E-poll books are especially easy to hack and are notorious for breaking often. This could cause serious delays. He recommends that polling stations print multiple copies of the voter registration lists for each district. 

In our column on voting machines this past spring, I noted that the calibration of the touchscreen affects how the voters’ input maps to different locations on the screen.  If the calibration is incorrect, it could alter the voters’ choices.  During early voting for the November election, there are reports that this has happened in both Tarrant County, TX and in Shelby County, TN. The screen showed the proper vote, but the printed copy showed a vote for the unselected candidate.  If you are using the touch screen device, check your printed ballot. 

Although gambling might be the heart of Las Vegas, it should not be the heart of Election Day. Using this infrastructure to determine who governs our land is like pulling a handle of a slot machine in Caesar’s lobby 

The Cyber Guys: Critical Vulnerabilities in Voting Machines – Easy To Hack

J. Alex Halderman, a Computer Science professor at the University of Michigan, walks into a courtroom in Georgia. He borrowed a pen from the defense attorney and in under a minute he had broken into a Dominion voting machine where he could make the results anything that he wanted without a trace of his breach. 

Dr. Halderman was an expert witness that demonstrated just how vulnerable these voting machines are to tampering. He used a pen to hold down the power button on the voting machine. He waited 7 seconds until it came up in “safe” mode. From there he could open files and change the contents of files to include the results and audit files without a password.

Later Dr. Halderman showed how with just a $30 purchase on Amazon, he was able to create a technician card for the voting machines that gave him super user access. Once programmed, a hacker could make as many technician cards as needed and distribute across the voting area.

At this point you might be thinking, OK, but how many computer science professors are going to hack a voting machine? Well, it turns out in August of 2018 at a DEFCON hackathon conference, it took an 11-year-old boy 10 minutes to hack a simulated Florida state voting website and change the results of the election. There was not just one child, but 30 of the 50 children with age ranging from 8 to 16 were able to hack the simulated election website. 

Over the last 6 years there have been many lawsuits concerning the use of these machines all over the country. Not only in Georgia, but Pennsylvania, Michigan, Texas, Arizona, and more.

But it’s not just Dominion machines that have vulnerabilities. In the summer of 2020, students from the University of Pennsylvania conducted an audit of the ES&S voting system1. ES&S claims to be the world’s largest e-voting system vendor, supporting more than 67 million voter registrations with 97,000 touchscreen voting machines installed in 20 states, with optical ballot readers in 43 states. 

The team reported numerous critical vulnerabilities existed in nearly every component of the ES&S system. They identified serious and undetectable attacks that could be carried out by poll-workers and even individual voters. What makes matters worse is that these attacks are not limited to the local machines. There are several attacks that propagate like a virus to the backend systems on the network affecting all the results of a precinct or an entire county. According to their report, virtually every mechanism for assuring the integrity of precinct results and backend systems can be circumvented. With these machines, they found that almost every major component of ES&S can be altered or replaced by other components with which it communicates. In other words, there are many ways to get to the back end to modify the results. 

The calibration of the touchscreen affects how the voters’ input maps to different locations on the screen. If the calibration is incorrect, it could alter the voters’ choices. For example I vote for Alice for the school board on the touch screen, but the machine selected the opponent, Bob. This happened in Pennsylvania in the 2023 Superior Court election. When a voter would select ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on their ballot for one of the candidates, the vote was recorded on the paper ballot and the machine for the other candidate.

Some countries like Argentina and the Philippines have recently banned the use of the machines due to their vulnerabilities. There is talk in different states around the country about doing the same. What should we do to ensure that each voter’s choice counts?

The original article was published in the Sierra Vista Herald here.